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The Hong Kong government has commenced a public consultation exercise on a bill
to prohibit racial discrimination, which is expected to be introduced in the Legislative
Council in early 2005. The government has proposed to model the bill on the existing
Sex Discrimination Ordinance (SDO) and the Disability Discrimination Ordinance
(DDO). While there are advantages to adopting a familiar format, the author argues
that the SDO and DDO can be improved upon, in particular, that a more flexible
definition of indirect discrimination should be adopted and that special provisions be
drafted to address discrimination against new immigrants from mainland China.
The author takes the view that this is an opportune time to strengthen the enforcement
model for all of Hong Kong's anti-discrimination laws. The author proposes that
officers at the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) be empowered to take a
more proactive approach and that a specialist equal opportunities tribunal should be
established outside the auspices of the EOC.
Introduction
In September 2004 the Hong Kong government released Legislating Against
Racial Discrimination: a Consultation Paper.1 Unlike prior consultation exercises,
which asked whether legislation was necessary, the Consultation Paper assumes
that a bill will be drafted in 2005 and seeks views on the proposed approach.
Once enacted, it will be the first Hong Kong law to prohibit racial
discrimination, harassment, and vilification in the private sector. It will
apply to a wide range of fields, including employment, education, housing,
the administration of government programmes, and the provision of goods
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and services. The first part of this article considers the background and aims
of the legislation. Then the substantive proposals in the Consultation Paper
are considered. The government plans to model the bill on the existing Sex
Discrimination Ordinance (SDO) and Disability Discrimination Ordinance
(DDO).' While there are advantages to adopting a familiar structure,
improvements can be made. For example, special provisions should be drafted
to address discrimination against new immigrants from mainland China and
a more flexible definition of indirect discrimination should be adopted. The
exemptions could also be drafted in narrower and more precise language. In
the final section, it is argued that this is an opportune time to strengthen the
enforcement model for all of Hong Kong's anti-discrimination laws, as recent
research demonstrates that the current emphasis upon confidential concilia-
tion of complaints leaves too much power in the hands of respondents and
limits the social impact of the laws.
Background and Aims of the Legislation
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) 3 has bound the Hong Kong government for 35
years.' Article 2 obligates each State Party to "prohibit and bring to an end,
by all appropriate measures, including legislation as required by circumstances,
racial discrimination by any persons, group, or organisation." Since interna-
tional treaties are not directly enforceable in Hong Kong courts, this obligation
can only be fulfilled by enacting domestic legislation. The British govern-
ment enacted limited legislation prohibiting race discrimination in 1965 and
1968 and then significantly expanded its legislative framework with the
Racial Relations Act 1976. Although the Hong Kong government often cop-
ied British law reform in the colonial era, it declined to do so in this field,
arguing that anti-discrimination laws would burden employers and contra-
dict Hong Kong's laissez-faire economic policies. The local government also
claimed that the "circumstances" of Hong Kong did not require legislation
2 Sex Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 480), Laws of Hong Kong and Disability Discrimination
Ordinance (Cap 487), Laws of Hong Kong, both of which were enacted in 1995 and came into force
in 1996. The two ordinances are also published on the website of the Hong Kong Equal Opportuni.
ties Commission at http://www.eoc.org.hk.
ICERD was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106A
of 21 Dec 1965 and came into force on 4 Jan 1969.
4 The British government ratified the treaty in 1969 and applied it to its dependent territories, includ-
ing Hong Kong. The Chinese government, which ratified ICERD in 1981, notified the United Nations
Secretary-General, by letter dated 10 Jun 1997, that ICERD would continue to apply to Hong Kong
after the handover. See Consultation Paper (n 1 above), Annex A, p 41.
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because discrimination was not a significant problem here. This was an inde-
fensible position, given Hong Kong's colonial history and the documented
examples of discrimination in both the public and private sectors.
It was not until 1991, when the Bill of Rights Ordinance6 was enacted,
that the people of Hong Kong obtained a legal right to equality in the public
sector. Based upon the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Bill of Rights prohibits discrimination on numerous grounds,
including race, sex, and religious affiliation. However, it has had limited
impact, in part because it binds only the government and public authorities
but also because the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) has never been
given jurisdiction to enforce the equality provisions of the Bill of Rights. As
a result, litigation under the equality provisions of the Bill of Rights has been
rare.' Without the assistance of a body like the EOC, victims of discrimina-
tion will often lack the knowledge and the resources to challenge
discriminatory policies. For example, the government's system of allocating
students to secondary schools, which was declared unlawful in 2001, almost
certainly became unlawful in 1991 when the Bill of Rights came into force.
However, since it was never challenged under the Bill of Rights, the policy
was applied for another decade - to the detriment of many students.'
In 1994, former legislator Anna Wu made the first attempt to prohibit
discrimination in the private sector, by introducing the Equal Opportunities
Bill (EOB), which would have prohibited discrimination on several different
grounds, including race, sex, disability, age, and sexuality. The government
successfully opposed the EOB, but only by agreeing to introduce two nar-
rower pieces of legislation, the SDO and the DDO. At the time, the
government argued that Hong Kong needed to move "step by step" into the
5 For a discussion of racially discriminatory laws and government policies during the colonial era, see
Richard Klein, "Law and Racism in an Asian Setting: An Analysis of the British Rule of Hong Kong"
(1995) 18 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 223. For examples of discrimination dur-
ing the transitional period and since 1997, see Carole J. Petersen, "Equality as a Human Right: the
Development of Anti-Discrimination Law in Hong Kong" (1996) 34 Columbiajournal of Transnational
Law 335; Carole J. Petersen, "Equal Opportunities: A New Field of Law for Hong Kong", in Raymond
Wacks (ed) Hong Kong's New Legal Order (Hong Kong: HKU Press, 1999); and Kelley Loper, Race
and Equality: A Study of Ethnic Minorities in Hong Kong's Education System, Centre for Comparative
and Public Law Occasional Paper No. 12, Feb 2004 (available at http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/).
6 See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383), Laws of Hong Kong, especially s 8, Arts 1 and 22
(hereinafter the "Bill of Rights").
For one of the few Bill of Rights cases on alleged race discrimination, see R v Secretary for Civil Service
and the Attorney General, ex parte Association of Civil Servants (1995) 5 HKPLR 490, in which the
Association of Expatriate Civil Servants sought judicial review of the government's localisation policy
during the transition to 1997. The application was only partly successful as the court held that most
elements of the policy were justified under the circumstances.
8 The allocation system was finally changed after the EOC conducted a formal investigation under the
SDO and successfully sought judicial review in EOC v Director of Education [2001] 2 HKLRD 690.
For further discussion of the case, see Carole J. Petersen, "The Right to Equality in the Public Sector:
An Assessment of Post-Colonial Hong Kong" (2002) 32 HKLJ 104.
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field because anti-discrimination legislation was so new to the territory. Over
the years, the government continued to oppose efforts to expand Hong Kong's
legal framework for equality. Bills to prohibit race discrimination were drafted
by Elizabeth Wong before the handover and by Christine Loh after the
handover, but the government refused to support them. Bills to prohibit age
and sexuality discrimination were also opposed by the government and
defeated. As a result, the only new addition has been the Family Status Dis-
crimination Ordinance (FSDO), which was relatively non-controversial and
enacted in 1997.9
Three developments have gradually persuaded the government to soften
its position on a law to prohibit racial discrimination. First, non-governmen-
tal organisations (NGOs) have become increasingly active and skilled in
lobbying for legislation. One of these groups, Hong Kong Against Racial
Discrimination, has been particularly successful in encouraging victims of
discrimination to come forward and tell their stories. In the mid-1990s (when
the EOB, SDO and DDO were being studied in the Legislative Council),
ethnic minorities who suffered discrimination rarely complained. This was
probably because they were concerned about their right of abode in Hong
Kong after 1997 and had no desire to make trouble during the transition
period. Seven years after the handover, however, the position of these groups
is more settled and at least some members of ethnic minorities feel confident
enough to come forward. The stories that they have told are shocking for a
city that likes to think of itself as modern and cosmopolitan: an employer
who pays Nepalese employees lower salaries or benefits than Chinese
employees; landlords who refuse to rent apartments to South Asians; schools
that try to hire only Caucasians to teach English; nightclubs that openly charge
different entrance fees depending upon the customer's race; a security guard
who routinely tries to prevent Indonesian guests from visiting a resident in
the building." To the government's credit, it has included these and other
examples in the Consultation Paper, acknowledging that they constitute
violations of basic rights and must be addressed. Stories like these have also
been publicised in the press and seem to have increased public support for
legislation." The government's Home Affairs Bureau also published volun-
tary guidelines on avoiding race discrimination in employmentu and
established a Race Relations Unit, which has received and recorded
9 Family Status Discrimination Ordinance (Cap 527), Laws of Hong Kong, also published on the
website of the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission at http://www.eoc.org.hk.
10 See Consultation Paper (n 1 above), Annex B, pp 42-44.
1 Ibid., paras 13-16, pp 4-5, and Annex C (noting evidence of increased public support).
12 See Home Affairs Bureau, "Equal Opportunities: Code of Practice on Discrimination in Employment
on the Ground of Race" (Hong Kong Government, Apr 1998).
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complaints of race discrimination. By gathering data on the number and na-
ture of complaints, the Race Relations Unit has documented the need for
legislation. While noting that some complaints were found to be the result of
"misunderstandings", the government acknowledges that others have proven
to be "quite well-founded" examples of racial discrimination in the private
sector." The Race Relations Unit can attempt to conciliate these complaints
but can take no further action if the discriminator does not want to change,
since the Unit has no law to back it up and no enforcement powers.
The second development that has affected the government's position is
that Hong Kong's equality movement now enjoys greater support from the
business community, particularly from foreign chambers of commerce. " Once
again, the stories of victims have played a role. The business community
appears to have been moved in part by the revelation that even wealthy pro-
fessionals are not immune to discrimination. South Asians who are prepared
to rent luxury flats often find that landlords reject their applications when
they discover the ethnicity of the prospective tenant. One Indian business-
man described how he finally posed as an Italian in order to secure a lease. 1
An Indian woman was rejected by landlords so many times that her Cauca-
sian rental agent proposed a scheme: when they looked at flats the Indian
woman posed as the agent while the Caucasian woman pretended to be the
prospective tenant. Hearing these stories, international companies and
chambers of commerce realised that the current situation is bad for business.
If Hong Kong develops a reputation for tolerating such blatant examples
of discrimination then some tourists and international conventions may
not come here. International staff also may resist living here and multina-
tional companies may decide to locate elsewhere in the region. While the
local business community has been somewhat less supportive (probably
because it has less experience complying with anti-discrimination laws than
multinational companies), its opposition to legislation also appears to have
softened."o This is an important development because the government tradi-
tionally cited the business community's views as a primary reason for not
enacting a law.
The third factor leading to this public consultation is that the Hong Kong
government has an interest in boosting its reputation with the international
committees that monitor compliance with human rights treaties. Hong Kong
13 See Consultation Paper (n 1) above, para 16, pp 5-6.
14 Ibid., para 20, p 7. See also Ravina Shamdasani and Quinton Chan, "Strong Backing for Race Bias
Law", South China Morning Post, 5 Nov 2001.
15 See Consultation Paper (n 1 above), Annex B, p 43.
16 Ibid., para 12, p 4.
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has frequently been criticised by the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (known as the CERD Committee) for
failing to implement ICERD by enacting a specific law prohibiting racial
discrimination. The CERD Committee has not been impressed by the
government's response, which was to insist that Hong Kong's "circumstances"
did not require a law that applied to the private sector. Other international
monitoring bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee and the Commit-
tee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, have also been critical of the
government's position. The government has cited these comments, in the
Consultation Paper, as one of the reasons for proposing legislation." The Hong
Kong government is anxious to show the world that human rights are pro-
tected here after the handover. Thus, while the government rejects many of
the recommendations made by these international monitoring committees,
it likes to show that it has made at least some improvements in time for the
next periodic report. This has been particularly true in the last few years
because the Hong Kong government has suffered a good deal of negative
publicity, due to the Article 23 saga, the disagreements over the slow pace of
democratic reform, and the cuts to social welfare. The government has also
been accused of interfering with the independence of the EOC and this will
almost certainly be raised by more than one international monitoring body. 8
Introducing a bill to prohibit race discrimination is one way that the govern-
ment can ensure that it receives at least some positive comments from the
CERD Committee, the Human Rights Committee, and the Committee on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights at the next public hearings on its
reports under the relevant treaties.
When enacting the new law, the government and the legislature should
consider this background and also the aims of the legislation. The law should
be drafted sufficiently broadly so as to address the examples of discrimination
that have been identified in Hong Kong. The experiences of the victims,
which have played such an important role in the decision to legislate, should
be addressed. The new law should also comply fully with ICERD, since this is
one of the goals of legislating. With these purposes in mind, this article now
turns to the substantive proposals in the government's Consultation Paper.
17 Ibid., para 16, p 6.
18 For a discussion of the government's decision not to renew the contract of the former Chairperson of
the EOC, Ms Anna Wu, after the EOC successfully litigated two cases against the government and
the resulting concerns over the independence of the EOC, see Carole. J. Petersen, "The Paris Prin-
ciples and Human Rights Institutions: Is Hong Kong Slipping Further Away from the Mark?" (2003)
33 HKLJ 513.
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The Substantive Provisions of the Racial Discrimination Bill
The government's basic plan is to follow the format of the existing anti-
discrimination ordinances, the SDO, DDO, and FSDO. While there is some
value in adopting a familiar structure, we should not be wedded to these
ordinances. The legislative choices that were made in 1995 may not be the
best choices 10 years on. UK law, which the government used as its primary
model for the SDO in 1995, has been significantly updated and improved. In
the area of race discrimination, the UK has since enacted the Race Relations
Act 2000 (which places a duty upon all public services to actively promote
racial equality) and the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations
2003.1' Thus, if the government now simply copies the SDO framework, it
will be using "old" UK law as its model. Moreover, racial discrimination in
Hong Kong poses its own special problems and the legislation should be
tailored, where appropriate, to address them.
The Grounds of Discrimination: National Origin and Immigrants from Mainland
China
The government has proposed that the bill should prohibit discrimination on
the grounds of "race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin." These
grounds track the language of Article 1 of ICERD, which defines "racial dis-
crimination" to mean "any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin." However, it
would not be wise to simply copy these grounds into the new law, without
first considering the special circumstances of Hong Kong. As the CERD Com-
mittee has often observed, every jurisdiction should closely examine its own
circumstances and develop legislation and policies to address the problems
that exist there.
For Hong Kong, one of the most controversial issues is how to address
discrimination suffered by new immigrants from mainland China. The Hong
Kong government acknowledges that this discrimination occurs and has even
included information on mainland immigrants when it reported to the CERD
Committee, noting that they constituted a "distinct group" within the ethnic
majority.20 Now that it is time to legislate, however, the government has
taken the position that this discrimination is not within the intended scope
of a racial discrimination bill. The government has pointed out that most of
19 See Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, which came into force on 19 Jun
2003.
20 See Report of the Hong Kong SAR Under Article 9 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (submitted in 2000), especially paras 39-51, pp 58-64.
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the new immigrants from mainland China are Han Chinese and therefore "of
the same ethnic stock" as local Hong Kong Chinese.21 This is a somewhat
confusing statement and may have inadvertently created the impression that
the government thinks that racial discrimination is only possible between
members of different racial groups. Of course, that is not the case and this
author is confident that the government did not intend to imply this. Assume,
for example, that a Chinese headmaster refuses to hire a Chinese person to
teach English because the headmaster thinks that only Caucasian English
teachers look "authentic" to students and their parents. That would be an
example of a Chinese person discriminating on the grounds of race against
another Chinese person and would certainly be prohibited under the
government's proposed bill. Moreover, a Chinese person who has recently
immigrated to Hong Kong from the Mainland would be protected from that
type of discrimination in the same way that a Chinese person born in Hong
Kong would be protected.
The issue, therefore, is not whether new immigrants from China are
covered by the bill. They will be covered and if they suffer discrimination
on one of the grounds covered in the bill they will be entitled to a remedy
just like everyone else. The issue is what "grounds" of discrimination should
be included in the bill and whether the discrimination that new arrivals
from the Mainland most commonly suffer will fit within one of those grounds.
The government's position is that it will not fit because the discrimination
that Mainland immigrants commonly suffer is a form of "social discrimina-
tion" rather than a form of racial discrimination. However that is not entirely
clear. As noted above, the government has acknowledged that the bill
should prohibit discrimination on the ground of "national origin". The term
''national origin" generally refers to the country from which a person (or
her ancestors) immigrated or travelled. Countries that attract immigrants
from many different parts of the world, such as Canada, can have residents
and citizens with many different "national origins". Thus a person may have
Canadian nationality and Chinese national origin. One of the purposes of
including "national origin" in a racial discrimination law is to ensure that
immigrant communities have equal opportunities in employment, education,
housing, and other fields.
Of course, in a jurisdiction like Canada, where there are no restrictions on
movement within the country, the immigrants who need this protection all
come from a country outside Canada. Thus, the term "national origin" is
sufficient to protect them. In contrast, since there is a border between Hong
Kong and mainland China, the vast majority of immigrants to Hong Kong
21 See Consultation Paper (n 1 above), para 24, p 8.
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come from within the same country. This means that we have to consider
how the concept of "national origin" in ICERD should be interpreted and
applied in Hong Kong's racial discrimination law. This author suggests that
the term should be expressly defined in the statute so as to include "origin
from any territory outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region".
In this way, a new immigrant from mainland China would enjoy the same
protection from discrimination that a new immigrant from Nepal or some
other country would enjoy. Alternatively, the bill could expressly prohibit
discrimination on the ground that a person is an immigrant, an approach that
has been adopted in some jurisdictions.
Ethnic Origin and Discrimination on the Ground of Religious Affiliation
Another term that could be usefully defined in the bill is "ethnic origin",
which is inherently vague. The courts in the UK devised a test, albeit a fairly
inexact one, for determining whether a group can be considered an "ethnic
group". In essence, the group must be shown to have "a long shared history"
and cultural traditions of its own. The group must regard itself, and be
regarded by others, as a distinct community and have at least some of the
following characteristics: a common geographical origin; descent from a small
number of common ancestors; a common language (which may or may not be
peculiar to that group); a common literature; a common religion which dif-
fers from that of the general community; or the status of being a minority or
an oppressed group. This test was developed in Mandla v Dowell Lee,22 a case
in which Sikhs were held to constitute an ethnic group within the Racial
Relations Act 1976. Similarly, in CRE v Dutton, the Court of Appeal held
that the Irish travelling community (also known as gypsies) constitutes an
ethnic group.23 The outcome of the test depends to some extent on how well
the plaintiff can articulate the "group identity" and the characteristics that
distinguish it from the general community. The test can also lead to results
that may seem inconsistent to the general public. For example, although Jews
have been held to be an ethnic group under the Racial Relations Act 1976,
religious groups perceived to have a wider and more culturally diverse mem-
bership would not pass the Mandla test. Therefore, the government may wish
to increase certainty by defining the term "ethnic origin" in the bill. It could
also consider including a non-exclusive list of groups that are considered to
be distinct "ethnic groups" for the purposes of the law. This list should take
into account the complaints of discrimination that have been made in Hong
Kong so that groups that have been shown to require protection are covered.
22 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548.
23 CRE v Dutton [1989] IRLR 8.
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Although it may be tempting to wait for the courts to develop terms like
"national origin" and "ethnic origin", litigation under Hong Kong's existing
anti-discrimination laws has been rare. This is because the vast majority of
cases are resolved through the EOC's complaints resolution processes (an is-
sue which is discussed further below). Thus, if the bill does not define these
terms it may be a very long time before the courts have an opportunity to
develop and apply tests that are appropriate for the circumstances of Hong
Kong. In the meantime, those who are trying to comply with and enforce the
law would be forced to speculate on its scope.
Another way to provide greater certainty in the legislation would be to
expressly include "religious affiliation or belief' as a prohibited ground of
discrimination, in which case the title of the bill may need to be amended.
This would eliminate the need for a religious group to argue that it is also
an "ethnic group" in order to secure protection from discrimination. The
Bill of Rights already prohibits the government and public authorities from
discriminating on the ground of religious affiliation so this is not an un-
known concept in Hong Kong law. It is also increasingly common for
jurisdictions to prohibit discrimination on the ground of religion in the
private sector. There is, in fact, no logical reason why discrimination on
the ground of religion should not also be prohibited in a diverse community
like Hong Kong.
Discrimination on the Grounds of the Racial or Ethnic Background of an
Associate
The government has proposed to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of
the race or ethnicity of the spouse or relative of a person. Thus, if a landlord
refuses to rent to a prospective tenant because his wife is South Asian, the
prospective tenant could bring an action for discrimination in his own name.
This is a good suggestion, but this author would propose to expand it by pro-
hibiting discrimination (as well as harassment and vilification) on the grounds
of the race, ethnicity, colour, descent, or national origin of an associate of a
person. The advantages of this approach can be seen from the following
example: suppose that a student at the University of Hong Kong wishes to
rent an apartment and the landlord refuses to rent it to her because her room-
mate is Nepalese. Since her roommate is not her spouse or relative the student
would not be able to file a complaint of racial discrimination under the
government's proposed language. However, if the language is expanded to
include "associates" as well as spouses and relatives, the student could file a
complaint in her own name. Similarly, if a group of friends is denied admis-
sion to a bar (or charged a higher admission fee) on the ground of the ethnicity
of one member, then all members of that group should be able to file
complaints.
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There is precedent for this approach as the Hong Kong DDO prohibits
discrimination on the ground of the disability of an associate and this provi-
sion has proven valuable in redressing actual cases of discrimination.2 4 There
is no reason why we should not provide similar protection in the racial dis-
crimination law.
The Definition of Discrimination
Hong Kong's existing anti-discrimination laws employ the traditional two-
part definition of direct and indirect discrimination. The government has
proposed to take the same approach in the racial discrimination bill. Direct
discrimination would be defined as treating a person "less favourably" on one
of the prohibited grounds. The courts normally apply the "but for" test to
determine whether direct discrimination has occurred and this is unlikely to
be controversial. The legislature should make sure, however, that the racial
discrimination bill includes an equivalent of s 4 of the SDO, which makes it
easier to prove discrimination in cases where more than one factor may have
influenced the defendant's actions towards the plaintiff."
The definition of indirect discrimination proposed by the government is
more problematic. Indirect discrimination is supposed to address practices
and policies that appear to be neutral but have a disproportionate and detri-
mental impact when applied to certain groups. In the ICERD treaty, this is
covered by the fairly simple "purpose or effect" language in Article 1. However,
the definition used in the SDO and the DDO is more complex and has been
criticised as too narrow. If this same definition is used in the racial discrimi-
nation bill then a plaintiff seeking to prove indirect discrimination would be
required to identify a "requirement or condition" imposed by the defendant
that the plaintiff cannot comply with and also to show that the proportion of
persons in the plaintiff's racial or ethnic group that can comply with it is
considerably smaller than the general population. This evidence would raise
a "prima facia" case of indirect discrimination and the burden of proof would
then shift to the defendant to show that the requirement or condition is jus-
tified under the circumstances. An example of indirect discrimination (under
the government's proposed definition) would be a requirement by a second-
ary school that all of its English teachers must have graduated from a university
in England. Even if this requirement were applied to all applicants, it is clear
24 See K, Y, and Wv Secretary for justice [2000] 3 HKLRD 777, in which the District Court held unlaw-
ful a government policy of rejecting an applicant for jobs in the disciplined services if the applicant
had a close relative who suffered from mental illness. The Court found that this policy constituted
unlawful discrimination on the ground of the disability of the applicant's associate.
25 For an example of the application of s 4 of the SDO, see Chang Ying Kwan v Wyeth (HK) Ltd [2001] 2
HKC 129.
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that it would work to the detriment of certain ethnic and racial groups. It is
also clear that the secondary school would not be able to justify the require-
ment as necessary for that job.
The problem with the government's proposed definition of indirect dis-
crimination is that it is likely to be interpreted rather narrowly by the courts.
Prior to 2003, the "requirement or condition" language was also used in the
definition of indirect discrimination in the Race Relations Act 1976 and
courts in the United Kingdom tended to interpret this as requiring the plain-
tiff to identify some policy that acted as an "absolute bar" to her hiring,
promotion, or other benefit.26 As hiring decisions are normally based upon a
balance of many different criteria, this can be very difficult to establish. While
the interpretation given to the phrase by the UK courts can be criticized, it is
entirely possible that the Hong Kong courts would follow the same approach
if the new racial discrimination law includes the "requirement or condition"
language in the definition of indirect discrimination.
We can return to the secondary school example to illustrate the potential
problem with the "requirement or condition" language. Suppose that the
school stated, in its job advertisement, that: "All candidates are required to
have a university degree and extra points will be awarded during the selec-
tion process to applicants who hold degrees from British universities." If an
applicant with a degree from a university in Hong Kong alleged that this was
indirect discrimination the defendant would argue that the policy did not
constitute a "requirement or condition" because it was not an absolute bar to
a Hong Kong graduate. An applicant with a local degree could apply and
would be considered, albeit at a disadvantage when compared to applicants
with degrees from British Universities. If the Hong Kong courts followed the
same approach as the English courts, this policy would probably be found to
be outside the definition of indirect discrimination, although it clearly would
have a discriminatory effect.
The UK has now dealt with this problem by amending its definition of
indirect discrimination so to comply with the European Union Directive on
equal treatment between persons, irrespective of racial or ethnic origins.27
The Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 now sets forth
a new definition of indirect discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic and
national origin." Indirect discrimination occurs when a person A applies to
another person B:
26 See, for example, Perera v Civil Service Commission and Department of Customs & Excise (No 2) [1983]
IRLR 166; and Meer v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1988] IRLR 399.
27 See European Union Council Directive 2000/43 EC of 29 Jun 2000, which addresses the principle of
equal treatment between persons, irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, in the areas of employment,
social protection, social advantage, education, and access to and supply of housing, goods and services.
28 See Race Relations Act (n 19 above), at Regulations 3-4. The old definition of indirect discrimina-
tion still applies to claims of discrimination on the grounds of colour or nationality.
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* a provision, criterion or practice which A applies to everyone; and
* the provision, criterion or practice puts (or would put) people from B's
race or ethnic or national origin at a particular disadvantage; and
* the provision, criterion or practice puts B at a disadvantage; and
* A cannot show that the provision, criterion or practice is a proportion-
ate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
This language is more flexible than the "requirement or condition" lan-
guage proposed by the Hong Kong government and would also do a better job
of complying with the requirements of ICERD. The words "provision, criterion,
or practice" would include the type of discrimination described above in the
secondary school example. It could also include informal practices that work
to the disadvantage of particular racial or ethnic groups.
Another problem with the definition of indirect discrimination proposed
by the Hong Kong government is that it would require the plaintiff to prove
that a "considerably smaller proportion" of people from the plaintiff's racial
group are able to comply with the "requirement or condition" compared
with people not from that group. A plaintiff may not be able to produce
statistical data demonstrating the difficulty that her group has in complying,
especially if the policy that is being challenged is fairly new. While such
statistical evidence is not essential, its absence can make it difficult to prove
a differential impact. The definition adopted by the UK in the 2003 Regu-
lations only requires evidence that the provision, criterion or practice "puts
or would put people from a particular racial or ethnic group at a particular
disadvantage." Thus it allows a plaintiff to challenge discriminatory poli-
cies or practices at an earlier stage.
Ideally the government should have explained these recent reforms to UK
law in the Consultation Paper. Members of the public and the Legislative Coun-
cil could then reach an informed opinion on whether the reforms should also
be adopted in Hong Kong. The SDO and the DDO can always be amended,
perhaps at the same time, to maintain consistency. It should be noted that
the definition of indirect discrimination in the SDO and DDO had already
been criticized in 1995, when these two laws were enacted. Several legislators
attempted to persuade the government at that time to use a wider, more
updated, definition. The government defeated those proposed amendments
in 1995 by arguing that Hong Kong should stick with the definition used in
the UK. Now that the UK has also rejected that old definition, the
government's argument is much weaker. Hong Kong should adopt the best
possible definition of indirect discrimination, one that will fully comply with
its obligations under ICERD.
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The Definitions of Racial Harassment and Vilification
The government has proposed to make racial harassment unlawful and to
define it as:
"[U]nwelcome or unwanted conduct (which may include verbal abuse or
hate mail) on account of the racial or ethnic background of the person
harassed in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to
all the circumstances, would have anticipated that the person harassed
would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by that conduct."29
This proposed definition is similar to s 2(6) of the DDO which
defines disability harassment as:
"[Ulnwelcome conduct (which may include an oral or written statement)
on account of [the] second-mentioned person's disability, or on account of
the disability of an associate of [the] second-mentioned person, in circum-
stances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances,
would have anticipated that the second-mentioned person would be
offended, humiliated, or intimidated by that conduct."
The one significant difference between the two definitions of harassment
is that the DDO includes unwelcome conduct on account of the disability of
a person's associate, consistent with the fact that the DDO prohibits discrimi-
nation on the ground of the disability of a person's associate. Earlier in this
article, this author suggested that the new law should also prohibit discrimi-
nation on the ground of the race or ethnicity of a person's associate. If that
suggestion is followed then the definition of racial harassment should be simi-
larly expanded. Similarly, the definition of vilification should be expanded to
include vilification on the ground of the racial or ethnic background of a
person's associate. Moreover, the government has already stated that it in-
tends to prohibit discrimination on the ground of the race or ethnicity of a
person's spouse or relative. Thus, regardless of whether the "associate" lan-
guage that this author has suggested is added, the bill should prohibit
harassment and vilification on the account of the racial or ethnic background
of a person's spouse or relative. This can be easily accomplished by inserting
the words "or on account of the racial or ethnic background of the spouse or
a relative" into the proposed definitions of racial harassment and vilification.
The value of having broad definitions of harassment and vilification
has already been demonstrated in Hong Kong. Consider, for example, the
29 See Consultation Paper (n 1 above), para 39, p 12.
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incidents in which residents who were hostile to the establishment of
neighbourhood health centres have harassed not only the clients of the cen-
tres but also family members who have accompanied clients to the centres
and staff who work there." Although these victims of harassment do not
have a disability themselves, they can file complaints of harassment under
the DDO. It is important that they be able to file complaints in their own
names because their relatives (or patients or friends) who have disabilities
may be reluctant to file complaints, due to privacy concerns. The same con-
siderations may apply in cases of racial harassment or vilification.
The government's Consultation Paper mentions only one definition of
racial harassment, whereas the SDO also provides an alternative definition
which expressly prohibits "hostile work environment" harassment. While
many forms of hostile environment harassment would probably fit within the
government's proposed definition, it may wish to consider adding an express
reference to hostile environment. The language used in s 2(5)(b) of the SDO
could be modified to fit the racial discrimination bill. Alternatively, the
government could refer to the UK's 2003 Regulations which define racial
harassment as including unwanted conduct on the grounds of race or ethnic
or national origins "which has the purpose or effect of (a) violating that
other person's dignity; or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, or
offensive environment for him." Like the definition proposed by the Hong
Kong government, the UK legislation also expressly incorporates the
"reasonable person" standard by providing that conduct shall only be regarded
as having the effect specified in (a) or (b) above if "having regard to all the
circumstances, including in particular the perception of that other person, it
should reasonably be considered as having that effect.""
Exemptions
The government has proposed a three-year exemption for small businesses,
on the ground that a similar exemption was given when the other anti-
discrimination laws were enacted." However, the argument for a temporary
exemption was probably stronger then, as this was a new field of law for Hong
Kong in 1995. Since small businesses have now been complying with three
anti-discrimination laws for several years, they may not need a temporary
exemption from this law. If one is required then it would be reasonable to
shorten the temporary exemption to one year.
30 For a report on incidents of this nature, see Equal Opportunities Commission, Report on Case Study of
Kowloon Bay Health Centre (Hong Kong: 1999).
3 See Race Relations Act (n 19 above), Regulation 5.
32 See Consultation Paper (n 1 above), para 60, p 18.
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The government has also proposed two very broad exemptions for itself.
The first would provide that the legislation should not affect any immigra-
tion legislation governing the entry, stay in, or departure from Hong Kong of
persons who do not have the right to enter and remain here. The second
would exempt a discriminatory action by the government where "it is an act
done for the purpose of complying with a requirement of an existing statutory
provision."33 In my view, these two proposed exemptions are overly broad
and should be made more specific. There may be situations in which the
government can justify differential treatment. However, government officials
should be able to identify and explain those situations to the public and to
the Bills Committee and then propose language that is narrowly tailored to
the legitimate aims that have been identified.
Suggested Improvements to Hong Kong's Enforcement Model
The EOC was established in 1996 to enforce the SDO and the DDO and its
jurisdiction was later expanded to include the FSDO. Although it is possible
that the legislature will establish a separate body to enforce the new racial
discrimination law, the more likely scenario is that this law will also be added
to the EOC's terms of reference. This is, therefore, a good time to review the
existing enforcement model and consider possible reforms. This section sum-
marizes the findings of a recent study of the EOC's powers and approach in
the context of gender and disability discrimination. 1
The EOC's primary enforcement mechanism is the power to investigate
and conciliate complaints of discrimination and harassment. It rarely exer-
cises its more coercive powers, such as the power to conduct formal
investigations, the power to assist complainants who wish to litigate, or the
power to litigate in its own name. Litigation without the EOC's assistance is
also rare. Although complainants have the right to file complaints directly in
the District Court the vast majority cannot afford legal representation. They
therefore rely entirely upon the EOC, which has a statutory duty to attempt
to conciliate complaints. Thus, a complainant is effectively obligated to
attempt conciliation, as long as the respondent is willing to do so. Moreover,
once a complainant enters the conciliation phase she will have a strong
3 Ibid., paras 57-58, p 17.
3 For a more complete report on the study (including the data obtained from a random sample of 451
complaints, the statistical analysis, and interview results), see Carole J. Petersen, Janice Fong, and
Gabrielle Rush, Enforcing Equal Opportunities: Investigation and Conciliation of Discrimination Com-
plaints in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Centre for Comparative and Public Law, 2003).
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incentive to accept the remedy that is offered to her, even if it is rather meagre.
She knows that if she rejects the offer, her complaint will be classified as
"unsuccessfully conciliated" and the EOC will take no further action on her
behalf unless she then applies for legal assistance. She will have also been
advised that there is no guarantee that legal assistance will be granted. By this
time she will have invested significant time and emotional energy in the com-
plaint and will not want to walk away with nothing. In contrast, respondents
are in a far more powerful position: they also know that the vast majority of
complainants cannot afford to litigate on their own and that there is a good
chance that EOC legal assistance will not be granted. Thus, the respondent
can afford to offer a fairly small remedy. The complainant may very well
accept it in order to avoid an unsuccessful conciliation. On the other hand, if
she rejects the offer and legal assistance is later granted, the respondent can
almost certainly still settle the complaint at a later stage by making a more
reasonable offer.
In our recent study of the EOC's complaints process we traced the progress
of a random sample of all complaints filed under the SDO, DDO and FSDO
and concluded by the EOC in a nine-month period. Of the 451 complaints in
our sample:
204 (45%) were discontinued by the EOC;
158 (35%) were conciliated;
18 (4%) were resolved outside of the EOC's complaints process; and
71 (16%) were classified as "unsuccessfully conciliated".
Of the 71 complaints that were classified as unsuccessfully conciliated,
the complainant applied for EOC legal assistance in 32 cases. Of those 32
applications, 15 were denied assistance and those complaints likely died at
this stage. Legal assistance was therefore granted in only 17 of the original
451 complaints in our sample (less than 4 per cent of the total). Moreover, in
five of these cases the EOC provided only preliminary legal advice and did
not offer to represent the complainant in full litigation. In another nine cases
the parties settled before legal action was taken and in one case the com-
plainant withdrew. Thus, at the end of our study period, the EOC was preparing
for court proceedings in only two cases of the original 451, which is less than
one-half of one per cent of the total complaints in our sample." Statistics
collected by the government indicate that our sample is representative of the
general pattern. According to the government, the EOC has commenced
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court proceedings in less than one per cent of the 5,778 complaints it
received from 1996 to 2003.36
While some people may consider the lack of litigation a good thing, those
who work in the equality field may feel otherwise. If respondents feel that
there is no realistic threat of being sued they will have less incentive to offer
meaningful remedies in conciliation. When we examined the remedies that
were obtained in our sample of complaints we found that it was rare for the
complainant to receive substantial monetary compensation. To some extent
this is because complainants often seek non-monetary remedies, such as an
apology, a positive reference letter, an improvement in access to a building,
or the establishment of a policy prohibiting sexual harassment."7 However, it
is noteworthy that monetary compensation was requested in 75 complaints
that proceeded to conciliation but only obtained in 35 complaints. In the
other 40 complaints in which a financial remedy was requested the com-
plaint either could not be conciliated or the complainant gave up her request
for monetary compensation in order to reach an agreement. The amount of
compensation also tended to be quite small, with the median award at only
HK$20,000.38 Of course, in certain cases, the respondent may justifiably
believe that the complaint is weak and that it does not warrant a substantial
offer. However, even respondents facing strong cases sometimes can be
painfully stubborn, as evidenced by the refusal of the government to settle
the cases of K, Y, and W v the Secretary for Justice39 and EOC v Director of
Education.40 It would not be surprising if respondents who do not expect to be
sued were even less cooperative.
Litigation also plays an important role in public education and in judicial
development of the legislation. Our interviews with disability rights groups
indicate that they are particularly disappointed with the lack of litigation
on accessibility issues." While a confidential settlement at the EOC may
36 See Consultation Paper (n I above), para 14, p 5.
3 See Petersen et al (n 34 above), Table 16, p 37.
38 Ibid., pp 39-40.
39 K, Y, and W v Secretary for Justice [2000] 3 HKLRD 777. The judge noted that the government had
declined to conciliate the cases or to voluntarily change the hiring policy, even after a government
task force and the EOC had advised it that the policy violated the DDO.
40 EOC v Director of Education [2001] 2 HKLRD 690. In this case the government originally indicated
that it would reform the system in response to the EOC's formal investigation but then later changed
its position and said that it would instead defend the system in court, where it lost conclusively.
41 See Petersen et al (n 34 above), Ch 6, for a more complete discussion of the interview results, which are
only summarized here. It should be noted that while the sample of complaints was completely random,
the interviewees could not be randomly selected as we depended upon contacts with the EOC and with
NGOs to locate people who were willing to be interviewed. Thus, the views expressed in the interviews
may not be representative of the general group of people who have used the EOC's services. However,
the statements made in the interviews were quite consistent and likely represent the views of at least an
important segment of people who have participated in the EOC complaints process.
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provide one complainant with a wheelchair ramp in her building, a litigated
case would hopefully encourage building owners throughout Hong Kong to
make their buildings and public areas more accessible.
Our interviews also reveal that some complainants resent what they feel is
an obligation to conciliate and to compromise on their principles. Some of
our interviewees had genuinely hoped to obtain a hearing, a judgment, and
vindication of their position. Some women who had filed complaints of sexual
harassment also told us that it was demeaning to be asked to "negotiate" with
the respondent and to specify an amount of money that would satisfy their
claims. They felt that this was equivalent to telling the respondent that it was
acceptable to sexually harass women as long as he paid for it later. They
argued that a judgment would be more likely to prevent the respondent from
repeating the harassment with other women and would also be the most
effective way to encourage employers to adopt policies against sexual
harassment. This is not to say that all complainants would prefer a public
hearing of their complaints. Indeed, it is likely that the majority of complain-
ants would like to avoid the publicity of a trial and the hostile
cross-examination of the respondent's attorneys. However, it does appear that
a certain percentage would prefer to skip the conciliation phase and seek a
hearing and a judgment. Some of the EOC officers whom we interviewed
estimated that as many as 20 per cent of all complainants feel this way.
Unfortunately, under the current model they cannot skip conciliation unless
they can afford private legal representation.
One way to reform the system would be to relax the EOC's statutory duty
so that it is not obligated to attempt conciliation before granting legal
assistance. Rather, if the complainant is not interested in a confidential
settlement, the EOC could consider an application for legal assistance
immediately. It is also very important that the EOC be given an adequate
budget for litigation and that the government not take any retaliatory actions
against the EOC when it litigates against government departments. The
government's failure to reappoint Anna Wu for a second three-year term was
widely seen as an attempt to "rein in" the EOC and make it less likely to
confront the government in future.42
Another way to strengthen the enforcement model would be to establish
an affordable and accessible equal opportunities tribunal. This would take
some time, especially as there are many different models of tribunal to consider,
but the EOC has apparently been studying the issue and will soon be in a
position to make a recommendation to the government. In addition to pro-
viding a forum for those complainants who do not wish to conciliate their
42 See Petersen (n 18 above).
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claims, a tribunal might also improve the bargaining position of the com-
plainants who participate in conciliation. Respondents would have a greater
incentive to offer substantial remedies and settle complaints if they know
that the complainant can file a complaint in an affordable tribunal at any
time, without first going through the "funnel" of applying for EOC legal
assistance.
The other issue that needs to be addressed is the position of complainants
during the investigation and conciliation phases at the EOC. Hong Kong
adopted an enforcement model that emphasises conciliation because it was
assumed to be faster, less expensive, and less stressful for the parties than
litigation. It is also sometimes argued that conciliation is particularly appro-
priate for Hong Kong because of its predominantly Chinese community.41
On the other hand, there is a risk that power imbalances will be perpetuated
during conciliation, particularly if the conciliator adopts a strictly neutral
position, which is the current approach of the Hong Kong EOC. The major-
ity of respondents in our sample were not individuals but rather private sector
companies, government departments, and public sector institutions. This
means that the respondent can choose whom to appoint to represent it dur-
ing the complaint and respondents commonly appoint managers, government
officers, in-house lawyers, or other skilled employees. Thus the complainant
often finds herself attempting to negotiate with someone with far greater socio-
economic power and far more experience with the law. If the complainant
were litigating the case with EOC legal assistance she would have a lawyer by
her side who would advocate her position. In contrast, in the conciliation
phase, the complainant almost never has her own legal representation and
the EOC lawyers are not involved. The EOC conciliation officer also does
not advocate on behalf of the complainant. This often comes as a surprise to
complainants, as they expect the EOC officer to actively advise and assist
them during the process. Indeed, the most common complaint articulated in
our interviews with past complainants and representatives of women's and
disability groups was that the EOC officers are too "neutral" towards the
complaint. The EOC officers whom we interviewed confirmed that complain-
ants often look to them for assistance and are disappointed when the officers
explain their duty of neutrality. The officers feel that they cannot give more
assistance under the current model as respondents will accuse them of bias.
The lack of an advocate is particularly significant because the processes of
investigation and conciliation often turn out to be less consensual, and more
adversarial, than complainants expect. Once notified of the complaint, the
4 See, for example, Ng Sek-hong, "Employment and Human Rights in Hong Kong: Some Recent De-
velopments" (1994) 24 HKLJ 108; and Bobby K.Y. Wong, "Traditional Chinese Philosophy and
Dispute Resolution" (2000) 30 HKLJ 304.
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respondent will often try to persuade the EOC that the complaint is without
merit and should be discontinued. The respondent may also send the EOC
lengthy letters with complex arguments. The complainant will then be asked
to respond to the respondent's letters. This is an extremely stressful process
for many complainants and they often feel inadequate and overwhelmed.
The EOC has attempted to reduce the stress of investigation by introduc-
ing the option of early conciliation. This means that the parties are encouraged
to attempt conciliation even before an investigation is conducted. Our study
shows that early conciliation does have a higher rate of success than post-
investigation conciliation but there may be certain disadvantages. The
complainant will not have as much information from the respondent when
she enters the conciliation and may have a harder time anticipating the argu-
ments that the respondent will make. In any event, regardless of whether the
parties pass through early conciliation, post-investigation conciliation (or
both), the complainant will probably find the conciliation phase intimidating,
particularly if the parties participate in a face-to-face conciliation conference.
Our interviewees frequently described the fear that they experienced when
asked to negotiate with their former supervisor or other "official" represent-
ing the respondent during the EOC process. Complainants do often bring
along a friend or a representative of an NGO but this person typically is only
allowed into the conference if the respondent agrees. These findings argue in
favour of giving the EOC more authority to actively assist complainants, par-
ticularly when the complaint has been filed against a company or other
institutional respondent and when a clear imbalance of power exists. Com-
missions in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, have recognised that a more
interventionist approach by the conciliator is sometimes necessary to assist
the parties to participate in conciliation on equal terms. In order to ensure a
fair and just process, the EOC officer must be empowered to "move beyond
notions of formal equality as clearly treating unequals equally will exacerbate
rather than ameliorate party disadvantage.""
The need for a more proactive approach to conciliation will likely be even
greater once a race discrimination bill is enacted, in part because the com-
plainants and the NGOs that assist them will be unfamiliar with the law and
also because the EOC will probably be working with an increased percentage
44 See Tracey Raymond and Jodie Ball, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Context of Antidiscrimination
and Human Rights Law: Some Comparisons and Considerations, available on the website of the Austra-
lian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission at http://www.hreoc.gov.au. For further
discussion of the approaches that can be taken by conciliators, see Katherine Lynch, "Private Con-
ciliation of Discrimination Disputes: Confidentiality, Informalism and Power", paper presented at
Enforcing Equal Opportunities in Hong Kong: An Evaluation of Conciliation and Other Enforcement
Powers of the EOC, 14 Jun 2003, Centre for Comparative and Public Law, University of Hong Kong,
available at the CCPL website at http://www.hku.hk/ccpl.
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of clients who do not speak either Cantonese or English fluently. The EOC
will need to be given adequate resources, full independence, and a clear
mandate. Finally, the government must make its process of appointing mem-
bers to the EOC more transparent and ensure that it includes representation
from ethnic minorities. This should have been done long ago, since members
of ethnic minorities can currently file complaints under the SDO, DDO, and
FSDO. Minority representation will be even more important if the EOC takes
on the additional responsibility of enforcing a racial discrimination ordinance.
Members of Hong Kong's ethnic and immigrant communities will, no
doubt, have additional suggestions for the legislation and the enforcement
model. They will hopefully participate actively in this consultation exercise.
The government's proposals are to be welcomed and, with some fine-tuning,
can be turned into a comprehensive law that fully complies with ICERD and
suits the circumstances of Hong Kong.
